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Abstract
Government policies that attempt to alleviate credit constraints faced by small and
young firms are widely adopted across countries. We study the aggregate impact
of such targeted credit subsidies in a heterogeneous firm model with collateral con-
straints and endogenous entry and exit. A defining feature of our model is a non-
Gaussian process of firm-level productivity, which allows us to capture the skewed
firm size distribution seen in the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). We compare
the welfare and aggregate productivity implications of our non-Gaussian process to
those of a standard AR(1) process. While credit subsidies resolve misallocation of
resources and enhance aggregate productivity, increased factor prices, in equilib-
rium, reduce the number of firms in production, which in turn depresses aggregate
productivity. We show that the latter indirect general equilibrium effects dominate
the former direct productivity gains in a model with the standard AR(1) process,
as compared to our non-Gaussian process, under which both welfare and aggregate
productivity increase by subsidy policies.
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1 Introduction
Government policies that attempt to alleviate credit constraints faced by small and
young firms are widely adopted across countries; provision of subsidized credit is a prime
example of this.1 Despite the popularity of such targeted industrial policies, quantitative
studies on their macroeconomic effects are scarce.2 Subsidized credit helps small and
young firms achieve efficient and larger scales of production, thus resolving misallocation
of resources and enhancing aggregate productivity. However, increased factor prices in
equilibrium reduce the number of firms in production, which in turn depresses aggregate
productivity. The relative magnitudes of each channel—the direct productivity gains and
the indirect general equilibrium effects—depend on the underlying distribution of firms
and their financial status. Thus, whether long-run effects are productivity enhancing or
not is ambiguous.
In this paper, we offer a general equilibrium analysis of such targeted credit subsidy
policies by extending a heterogeneous firm model with collateral constraints and endoge-
nous entry and exit. In particular, we employ a Pareto-distributed firm productivity
process to capture the skewed firm size distribution in the Business Dynamics Statistics
(BDS). From our policy experiments, we have two main findings. First, aggregate produc-
tivity rises by at most 1.35 percent, following a credit subsidy policy for small or young
firms. While the policy promotes the reallocation of resources among firms, associated
indirect effects offset much of the potential gains in productivity. These indirect effects
arise from adjustments in the extensive margins which reduce the equilibrium number of
firms. Second, credit subsidy policies decrease aggregate productivity when a model is
inconsistent with the empirical firm size distribution. This is the case when we instead
use a standard AR(1) process of firm productivity, a common approach in the litera-
ture.3 It follows that the skewness of the firm size distribution is crucial in quantitatively
evaluating the aggregate effects of such policies.
Why do both extensive margin adjustments and firm size distribution matter? Models
with a standard AR(1) process cannot capture firms located at the right tail of the skewed
distribution of firms. Therefore, these models lack highly productive-small firms that
1 For example, the US Small Business Administration (SBA) provides a loan guaranty for entrepreneurs
starting or expanding small businesses under the 7(a) Loan Program. The volume of approved loans has
been growing in recent years, reaching $24 bil. in 2015. We provide a summary of the program in Section
4.1.
2 Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008), Buera, Moll, and Shin (2013), and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2017)
study the aggregate implications of policies aimed at specific groups of firms or entrepreneurs.
3 See Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) for a similar approach. In business cycle studies, see Khan and
Thomas (2008) and Bloom (2009) for the seminal works.
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could grow substantially if collateral constraints are lifted, and for whom there are large
potential gains from credit subsidy policies. In the absence of such firms with substantial
growth potential, the direct effect from credit subsidy policies is relatively small and is
dominated by the negative indirect effects in equilibrium. This indirect effect is amplified
when we also match the left tail of the firm size distribution. In equilibrium, many
small-unproductive firms endogenously respond to changes in the exit margin. When the
extensive margins are held fixed, on the other hand, the number of firms remains constant
by construction. A credit subsidizing policy then leads to a positive gain in aggregate
productivity, even when the assumed firm productivity follows an AR(1) process.
Our model builds on a standard heterogeneous firm model. The model has three
key ingredients. First, as discussed above, we employ a non-Gaussian process for firm-
level productivity which follows a bounded Pareto distribution. It is well-known that the
empirical distribution of firm employment is highly skewed. That is, small firms dominate
the business population, while large firms account for the largest fraction of aggregate
employment.4 Our specification of firm productivity successfully replicates the empirical
firm size distribution in the model economy. Second, we allow both endogenous entry
and exit by firms.5 This element is essential to reproducing the empirical patterns of firm
dynamics, including substantially lower survival rates among young firms. In addition,
it allows us to examine the role of extensive margin adjustments in affecting aggregate
productivity. Third, forward-looking collateral constraints are added, in the spirit of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The presence of collateral constraints restricts investment
decisions at the firm level, thereby hindering immediate firm growth upon entry.6 This,
together with the second ingredient, characterizes the firm lifecycle aspects with external
financing and the corresponding firm age distribution.7
We use this model to study the aggregate implications of targeted credit subsidy poli-
cies in a general equilibrium environment. In the absence of policy interventions, we
require the model to match the key macroeconomic aggregates, firm size and age distri-
butions, and firm dynamics patterns in the US. We then introduce a policy into the model
4 In 2012, the share of employment at large firms was 51.6 percent while the employment share of
small firms was 16.7 percent in the United States (Statistics of U.S. Businesses, 2012).
5 Khan and Thomas (2013), Buera and Moll (2015), and Catherine et al. (2018) abstract from
endogenous exit margins. Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011, 2017) study the importance of endogenous
extensive margins. Midrigan and Xu (2014) also explored this in their model.
6 See Bahaj, Foulis, and Pinter (2017) for the evidence on collateral constraints and firm investment.
7 There is extensive research on the importance of firm age. See, for example, Davis, Haltiwanger,
and Schuh (1996), Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), and Evans (1987). More recently, Fort et
al. (2013) focused on the firm age dimension during the Great Recession. Hsieh and Klenow (2014)
examined the lifecycle of plants and misallocation.
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which provides credit to financially constrained firms economy-wide. In this regard, our
approach is in line with that of Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2017), who studied the macroe-
conomic impact of large-scale microfinance in developing economies and highlighted the
importance of considering the general equilibrium effects of such policies. To avoid poten-
tial policy distortions, we assume that credit subsidies are lump-sum cash transfers from
households to targeted firms.8
From our policy experiments, we show that there are four effects at work, one direct
and three indirect, following a targeted credit subsidy. The direct effect emerges from
the fact that small and young firms can achieve an efficient scale of production through
subsidies. In the aggregate, the policy alleviates the capital misallocation that exists
across firms due to credit constraints. In line with the findings in previous studies (e.g.,
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Khan and Thomas (2013), Midrigan and Xu (2014)),
we demonstrate the quantitative importance of misallocation in explaining aggregate pro-
ductivity. In the meantime, the policy also brings indirect effects in general equilibrium.
First, increased demand for capital and labor—by the recipients of the subsidy–raise fac-
tor prices. Higher factor prices depress the scale of production of untargeted firms. The
second indirect effect is from adjustments in the extensive margins. Increased factor prices
affect both entry and exit thresholds, together with the policy that encourages more entry
by small firms. This is a cleansing effect that replaces less-productive incumbents with
productive entrants.9 The last effect is that there are fewer firms in operation because of
higher costs of production, thus depresses aggregate productivity.10
Our policy experiments focus on both small and young firms. It is widely known that
these firms are likely to experience more difficulties in financing their investment exter-
nally. For example, 61 percent of small firms reported that they faced financial challenges
and 76 percent among them used personal funds, according to the Small Business Credit
Survey 2016.11 Young firms in the survey faced relatively tougher borrowing conditions
due to a lack of credit history or limited access to credit. In addition, the recent literature
has documented that credit constraints faced by young firms compound adverse shocks,
8 See Catherine et al. (2018) for a similar application on the impact of an investment tax credit.
9 We examine the cleansing effect of industrial policies, while the business cycle literature has in-
vestigated the cleansing effect of recessions. See Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Osotimehin and
Pappada (2017), for example.
10 Under the decreasing-returns-to-scale, the number of production units in a model is positively
associated with the level of measured total factor productivity, holding aggregate factor inputs fixed. See
Khan, Senga, and Thomas (2016) for a similar channel.
11 The survey reports the business condition and the financial environment faced by small and young
businesses in the US. 10,303 responses were collected by 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks.
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which leads to high exit rates among them.12 Given its pervasiveness, we focus on a sub-
sidized credit policy that alleviates difficulties in external borrowing for small and young
firms, as in Buera, Moll, and Shin (2013).
In practice, there are a variety of government support schemes for small businesses.13
These actual policies are mostly in comprehensive packages which include legal and finan-
cial assistance, education of managerial skills, and so forth. Moreover, such policies are in
small-scale for a limited number of eligible firms. In contrast, we attempt to isolate the
macroeconomic impact of policies that are specialized to ease credit constraints among
firms. One such policy is the SBA loan program in the US, noted above.14 We also provide
a plausible and useful model counterpart of this policy in this paper. The corresponding
outcome from the model is consistent with our main findings though the magnitudes are
smaller, and we verify that the indirect effects described above are robust.
Across our policy experiment results, there are two main mechanisms affecting the
allocative efficiency of resources, one across incumbents (e.g., Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008)), and one across entering and exiting firms.15 The role of financial frictions in
generating resource misallocation and its aggregate implications have been studied by
Khan and Thomas (2013), Buera and Moll (2015), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), and
Midrigan and Xu (2014), among others. More recently, Catherine et al. (2018) studied
misallocation in a model of collateral constraints and found a positive productivity gain
from investment subsidies. Our policy exercises are distinct as we allow endogenous
firm entry and exit, which leads to our finding that the long-run effect on aggregate
productivity from alleviating credit constraints may be negative.
Our focus here is on the role of policies in reducing micro-level distortions. Previous
studies, in contrast, have looked at policies that distort the allocation of resources. Guner,
Ventura, and Xu (2008) considered a model with size-contingent regulations and used
their calibrated version of the model to show sizable welfare losses. Gourio and Roys
12 Collier et al. (2016) discuss the role of credit constraints in managing negative shocks.
13 Beginning in January 2011, the Obama Administration promoted a set of entrepreneur-focused
policies, including the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. The White House (2012) claims
that these policies allow “Main Street small businesses and high-growth enterprises to raise capital from
investors more efficiently, allowing small and young firms across the country to grow and hire faster.” The
targets of the policy initiatives include finance, education, red tape, innovation, and market opportunities
for entrepreneurs.
14 Similar but different industrial policies have been implemented in European and Asian countries. A
prime example includes the Moratorium Act in Japan enacted in 2009. This allows small businesses to
defer their debt repayment backed by government guaranties, while requiring banks to “endeavor to take
steps to alleviate the burden of debt.” The total amount of rescheduled loans is about $8 tn. in 2012.
15 Seminal empirical works on the allocative efficiency include Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013).
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(2014) also studied the aggregate implication of a French policy that distorts the size
distribution of firms, showing the important role of such policy distortion in explaining
aggregate productivity.16
We present our theory in Section 2. We calibrate the theoretical model and examine
the equilibrium before policy intervention in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the
impact of industrial policies, and Section 5 investigates the role of extensive margins and
skewed firm size distribution. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Time is discrete in infinite horizon. There are a large number of heterogeneous firms
producing a homogeneous good. Firms are subject to persistent shocks to individual pro-
ductivity and face collateral constraints. These, together with endogenous entry and exit,
yield substantial heterogeneity in production. Households are identical and infinitely-
lived. We abstract from aggregate uncertainty and consider a stationary industrial equi-
librium.
In the following sub-sections, we present our model economy and examine the optimiza-
tion problem of firms, followed by the household problem and the definition of recursive
competitive equilibrium. We then characterize firm-level decisions in a tractable way to
render our counterfactual exercises feasible. In particular, we summarize two firm-level
states, capital and borrowing, by using a single-state variable defined as cash-on-hand.
2.1 Firms
2.1.1 Production and Financial Friction
The economy consists of a continuum of firms. Each firm owns its predetermined
capital stock, k, and hires labor, n. The production technology is described by y =
εF (k, n), where F (·) exhibits decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRS) and ε represents firm-
level productivity. We assume that ε ∈ E ≡ {ε1, ε2, . . . , εNε} follows a Markov chain with
πεij ≡ Pr(ε′ = εj|ε = εi) ≥ 0 and
∑Nε
j=1 π
ε
ij = 1 for each i = 1, 2, . . . , Nε, where primes
denote future values for notational convenience.
Not all firms are able to finance their desired investment due to financial frictions.
All debt is priced at q, and each firm faces a borrowing limit on this one-period discount
16 See Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2016) and Braguinsky, Branstetter, and Regateiro (2011)
for econometric analyses of size-dependent policies.
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debt. This borrowing constraint restricts the amount of new debt level, b′, not to exceed
a firm’s collateral. Based on the idea of limited enforceability of financial contracts, we
assume that the firm’s future period capital, k′, serves as collateral for current borrowing.
Therefore, for a firm choosing k′ in the current period, the collateral constraint is given by
b′ ≤ θk′, where the financial parameter, θ, captures financial frictions at the economy-wide
level. Notice that θ is assumed to be common across firms, but the borrowing decision
depends endogenously on each firm’s state. When θ is close to the real interest rate, 1
q
, the
financial market allows firms to invest at their desired level. Note that our specification of
collateral constraints is forward-looking in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), while
we abstract from their feedback channel of asset prices.
In the presence of collateral constraints, firms gradually accumulate capital. Once
they achieve a capital level consistent with their expected productivity, they can also
accumulate financial savings, b′ < 0. This implies that a borrowing constraint is binding
for some but not all firms in a given period. In this way, the model reproduces the
observed heterogeneity in the reliance on external borrowing.
2.1.2 Entry and Exit
We model firm entry and exit based on the standard approaches in the literature.17 In
each period, incumbent firms may exit the economy either by an exogenous probability or
by their endogenous decisions. Due to the financial frictions at the firm-level, individual
states of productivity, capital, and borrowing jointly affect the latter endogenous exit
decision. Together with endogenous entry decisions by potential entrants, our model
features realistic firm dynamics.
At the beginning of each period, firms are informed of their respective status of exit
which takes place after production, and the fixed probability of exit, πd ∈ (0, 1), is common
across firms.18 The remaining firms after this exogenous exit need to pay ξo units of
output in order to continue operation in the next period. This fixed cost of operation
creates a binary exit decision. If a firm does not pay this cost, it has to exit the economy
permanently which implies its value is zero. Thus, only the firms continuing to the
next period make intertemporal decisions about investment and borrowing after paying
17 Hopenhayn (1992) is the seminal work in this literature with industry dynamics driven by firms’
endogenous entry and exit. Clementi and Palazzo (2016) modify the timing of entry in the Hopenhayn
model to investigate the business cycle implications of firm dynamics. We follow the similar approach of
Clementi and Palazzo, while introducing the exogenous exit as employed in Khan and Thomas (2013).
18 This is a simple way to avoid the Modigliani-Miller environment where financial frictions are irrele-
vant when firms survive long enough. Further, the exogenous exit assumption helps the model reproduce
the empirical distribution of firm age by allowing turnovers of large-mature firms.
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ξo.
19 This endogenous exit margin of firm dynamics enables relatively less-profitable
firms to endogenously choose to exit, which can potentially reduce the degree of resource
misallocation arising from financial frictions in the absence of policy interventions.
We further assume that there is a fixed measure, M e, of potential entrants in each
period. The potential entrants are uniformly distributed over their initial capital and debt
combination, (k0, b0), and the initial productivity of a potential entrant, ε0, is randomly
drawn from the ergodic distribution of ε ∈ E.20 When a potential entrant decides to
enter, it needs to pay a fixed entry cost, ξe, in units of output. In this way, we are able
to set up a simple binary problem of endogenous entry. Note that firm entry takes place
at the end of a period, and actual entrants start operating in the next period, given their
initial state, (k0, b0, ε0).
2.1.3 Timing and Firm Distribution
At the beginning of a period, an incumbent firm is identified by its individual state
vector, (k, b, ε); the predetermined capital, k ∈ K ⊂ R+; the amount of debt carried from
the previous period, b ∈ B ⊂ R; and the current period idiosyncratic productivity level,
ε ∈ E. We summarize the distribution of firms by a probability measure, µ(k, b, ε), which
is defined on a Borel algebra S ≡ K×B× E.
We illustrate the timing of the model in a given period as shown in the following
diagram. Given the current state, (k, b, ε), an incumbent firm maximizes the sum of its
current and future expected discounted dividends, considering its possible exit within
each period. At the beginning of a period, the firm realizes its exogenous exit status
after production. Once production is completed, all firms make payments for wage bill
and existing debt, and then πd share of firms on µ(k, b, ε) disappears exogenously. The re-
maining firms decide whether to continue to the next period by paying the fixed operation
cost, ξo. Conditional on staying, firms undertake intertemporal decisions on investment,
i, and borrowing, b′, while determining their current dividend payments, D. The capital
accumulation of each firm is standard, i = k′ − (1− δ)k, with δ ∈ (0, 1).
19 Both exogenous and endogenous exit occur after production is completed in a given period. This
ensures that all existing debt is repaid by the exiting firms.
20 The distribution of potential entrants is not observable in the data, so we choose to assume a uniform
distribution. k0 and b0 are jointly drawn from a density,
∫ k̄0
0
∫ b̄0
0
(k̄0 · b̄0)−1(d[k0×b0]). We assume that k̄0
corresponds to a fraction, χe, of the capital choice without financial frictions at the medium productivity
value of ε, and set b̄0 = θek̄0, where θe is the maximum leverage of potential entrants.
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(k, b, ε) (k′, b′, ε′)
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Paying ξo
Decisions
k′, b′, D
Potential Entrants
(k0, b0, ε0)
Endogenous
entry
No entry
Paying ξe
Timing within a Period
Meantime, potential entrants draw their initial state, (k0, b0, ε0), and decide whether
to enter the economy by paying the fixed entry cost, ξe.
21 Given its initial state, an
entering firm starts operating in the next period, along with the continuing incumbents
in the above. Markets are perfectly competitive, so firms take the wage rate, w, and the
discount debt price, q, as given.
2.1.4 Firm’s Problem
Given εi ∈ E, let v0(k, b, εi) be the value of a firm at the beginning of the current
period, before its survival from exogenous exit is known. Accordingly, define v1(k, b, εi) as
a surviving firm’s value, before making its decision to pay the operation cost ξo. Finally,
if the firm decides to continue to the next period, its value is given by v(k, b, εi). Then
the firm’s optimization problem can be recursively defined by using v0, v1, and v.
v0(k, b, εi) = πd ·max
n
[
εiF (k, n)− wn+ (1− δ)k − b
]
(1)
+ (1− πd) · v1(k, b, εi)
21 In general, the selection effect at the entry margin may differ by assumed timing. In Hopenhayn
(1992), there is a small selection effect since only firms with high productivity enter. As discussed by
Clementi and Palazzo (2016), the entry timing such as ours leads to richer heterogeneity across entrants
and thus stronger selection effect. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
8
v1(k, b, εi) = max
{
0,−ξo + v(k, b, εi)
}
(2)
In Equation (1), the firm takes the possibility of exogenous exit into account. In case it
is destined to exit by πd, the firm maximizes its liquidation value at the end of the period
without dynamic decisions. In case of surviving, on the other hand, the firm makes a
binary decision over the value of zero, (endogenous exit), and the value of −ξo+v(k, b, εi),
(stay), in Equation (2). The value of continuing to the next period is given by v(k, b, εi)
as below.
v(k, b, εi) = max
n,k′,b′,D
[
D + β
Nε∑
j=1
πεijv
0(k′, b′, εj)
]
(3)
subject to
0 ≤ D ≡ εiF (k, n)− wn+ (1− δ)k − b− k′ + qb′
b′ ≤ θk′
In (3), the firm optimally chooses its labor demand, n, future capital, k′, and new debt
level, b′, to maximize the sum of the firm’s current dividends, D, and the beginning-of-the-
period value, v0(k′, b′, εj), in the next period. Current period dividends are the residual
defined in the firm’s budget constraint, and we restrict them to be non-negative. Firms
discount their future expected values using β ∈ (0, 1).22 Financial frictions are introduced
in a collateral constraint on the firm’s new borrowing in the above maximization problem.
Lastly, we define the value of a potential entrant with (k0, b0, ε0) as v
e.
ve(k0, b0, ε0) = max
{
0,−ξe + βv0(k0, b0, ε0)
}
(4)
The potential entrant makes a binary decision to pay or not to pay the entry cost ξe. Once
it enters, the firm starts operation in the next period given its initial state, as indicated
in the value of entry in (4).
22 We also use β to denote households’ subjective discount factor in the next sub-section. Abstracting
from aggregate uncertainty, there is no stochastic discount factor in the above firm’s problem. Thus, the
equilibrium discount debt price, q, is equal to β.
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2.2 Households and Equilibrium
2.2.1 Representative Household
We assume that there is a unit measure of identical households in the economy. In
each period, households earn their labor income by supplying a fraction of their time
endowment. Period utility is given by U(C, 1−N), and households discount future utility
by a subjective discount factor, β. The representative household holds a comprehensive
portfolio of assets; firm shares of measure λ and non-contingent discount bonds φ. It
maximizes lifetime expected discounted utility by choosing the quantities of aggregate
consumption demand, Ch, and labor supply, Nh, while adjusting its asset portfolio. The
household value, V h, is defined as below.
V h(λ, φ) = max
Ch,Nh,λ′,φ′
[
U(Ch, 1−Nh) + βV h(λ′, φ′)
]
(5)
subject to
Ch + qφ′ +
∫
S
ρ1(k
′, b′, ε′)λ′(d[k × b× ε])
≤ wNh + φ+
∫
S
ρ0(k, b, ε)λ(d[k × b× ε])
We apply the following notation for stock prices. In (5), ρ1(k
′, b′, ε′) denotes the ex-
dividend prices of firm shares in the current period, and ρ0(k, b, ε) is the dividend-inclusive
value for current shareholding, λ. Let Φh(λ, φ) be the household’s decision for bonds and
Λh(k′, b′, ε′, λ, φ) its choice of firm shares corresponding to the future state (k′, b′, ε′).
2.2.2 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
We consider a stationary industrial equilibrium of the model, where the distribution
of firms, µ(k, b, ε), is time-invariant. In the following, we define recursive competitive
equilibrium. For simplicity, we denote the distribution of producing firms as µp, the
measure of actual entrants as µe, and the measure of endogenously exiting firms as µex.
Whenever possible, we suppress the arguments of functions in the definition below.
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of functions includ-
ing prices
(
w, q, ρ0, ρ1
)
, quantities
(
N,K,B,D,Ch, Nh,Φh,Λh
)
, a distribution
µ(k, b, ε), and values
(
v0, v1, v, ve, V h
)
that solve the optimization problems and
clear markets in the following conditions.
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1. v0, v1, and v solve Equations (1)–(3), and (N,K,B,D) are the associated
policy functions for firms.
2. V h solves (5), and (Ch, Nh,Φh,Λh) are the associated policy functions for
households.
3. The labor market clears, Nh =
∫
S N(k, ε) · µ
p(d[k × b× ε]).
4. The goods market clears.
Ch =
(∫
S
[
εF (k,N)− (1− πd)
(
K(k, b, ε)− (1− δ)k
)
+ πd(1− δ)k − ξo
]
· µp(d[k × b× ε])
)
+
∫
U(0,k̄0)
(k0 − ξe) · µe(d[k0 × b0])
−
∫
S
k · µex(d[k × b× ε])
5. The distribution of firms, µ(k, b, ε), is a fixed point where its transition is
consistent with the policy functions, (K,B), and the law of motion for ε.
2.3 Characterizing Firm-Level Decisions
2.3.1 Firm Types
To characterize the firm-level decision rules in the model, it is convenient to first define
a subset of firms in the distribution whose decisions are not affected by the collateral
constraints in any possible future state. In particular, we follow the approach of Khan
and Thomas (2013) to distinguish firm types in our model economy. Note that this
distinction is solely for deriving all the intertemporal decisions made by firms, and that a
firm may alter its type depending on the state variables.
We define a firm as unconstrained when it has already accumulated sufficient wealth
such that it never experiences binding borrowing constraints in any possible future state.
In this case, all the unconstrained firm’s Lagrangian multipliers on its borrowing con-
straints become zero, and the firm is indifferent between dividend payments and retained
earnings. On the other hand, the remaining firms in the distribution are defined as con-
strained. Constrained firms may or may not experience binding borrowing constraints
in the current period; thus, they choose to pay zero dividends in the current period as
the shadow value of retained earnings is greater than that of paying dividends. In the
following, we begin with deriving the decision rules by unconstrained firms in the model.
First, we derive the optimal static labor choice, which applies to all firms. Labor
choices are frictionless and a firm with (k, ε) chooses n = Nw(k, ε), which solves the static
labor condition, εD2F (k, n) = w.
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Next, we derive the choice of future capital, k′, by the unconstrained firms. The
collateral constraint is irrelevant for this type of firms, so we can easily derive their optimal
level of k′ = Kw(ε) as follows. Let Πw(k, ε) ≡ εF (k,Nw)− wNw be the current earnings
of a firm with its optimal labor hiring Nw. Given the Markov property for the assumed
stochastic processes and the absence of capital adjustment costs, Kw is the solution to
the following problem.
max
k′
[
− k′ + β
Nε∑
j=1
πεij
(
Πw(k′, εj) + (1− δ)k′
)]
With the policy functions Nw and Kw, the minimum savings policy, b′ = Bw(ε), is
recursively defined by the following two equations.
Bw(εi) = min
(εj)
Nε
j=1
(
B̃
(
Kw(εi), εj
))
(6)
B̃(k, εi) = εiF (k,N
w)− wNw + (1− δ)k −Kw(εi) (7)
+ qmin
{
Bw(εi), θK
w(εi)
}
B̃(Kw, εj) in (6) denotes the maximum level of debt (or the minimum level of saving)
that an unconstrained firm can hold at the beginning of the next period in which ε′ = εj
is realized. Having chosen the unconstrained choice of capital, Kw, at the current period,
the firm will remain unconstrained in the subsequent periods by definition. The minimum
savings policy, Bw, ensures that the firm’s debt never exceeds this threshold level, B̃, given
all possible realizations of ε. Moreover, the threshold function can be retrieved by using
Bw and Kw at the current period state with (k, εi), as in (7). Notice that the minimum
operator in (7) reflects the collateral constraint in the firm’s problem. In (6), Bw again is
determined to have the unconstrained firms unaffected by the constraint over any future
path of ε.
2.3.2 Cash-on-Hand and Decision Rules
The incumbent firm’s problem in (3) is a challenging object because of the occasion-
ally binding constraints for D and b′. In addition, notice that a firm’s individual state
vector includes two endogenous variables, (k, b), with each having a continuous support.
However, levels of k and b of firms do not separately determine the choices of k′ and b′.
This is due to the absence of any real adjustment costs in the model, and therefore we
can collapse these two continuous individual state variables into a newly defined variable
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called cash-on-hand. We define the cash-on-hand, m(k, b, ε), of a firm with (k, b, ε) by
using the optimal labor demand Nw.
m(k, b, ε) ≡ εF (k,Nw)− wNw + (1− δ)k − b
Notice that the decisions of k′ and b′ made by continuing incumbents determine the level
of cash-on-hand in the future period, m(k′, b′, ε′), along with the realization of ε′. By
using this new state variable, we rewrite the incumbent firm’s problem in (1)–(3) using
the following values W 0, W 1, and W .
W 0(m, εi) = πd ·m+ (1− πd) ·W 1(m, εi) (8)
W 1(m, εi) = max
{
0,−ξo +W (m, εi)
}
(9)
W (m, εi) = max
k′,b′,D,m′j
[
D + β
Nε∑
j=1
πεijW
0(m′j, εj)
]
(10)
subject to
0 ≤ D ≡ m− k′ + qb′
b′ ≤ θk′
m′j ≡ m(k′, b′, εj)
= εjF
(
k′, Nw(k′, εj)
)
− wNw(k′, εj) + (1− δ)k′ − b′
Having solved the unconstrained policies Kw and Bw, we define a threshold level of m
for each ε that distinguishes the unconstrained firms. From the firm’s budget constraint
in (10), an unconstrained firm pays the current dividends, Dw = m−Kw + qBw ≥ 0. It
follows that this firm’s cash-on-hand is greater than or equal to a certain threshold level,
m̃(ε) ≡ Kw(ε) − qBw(ε). Therefore, any firm with m(k, b, ε) < m̃(ε) can be identified as
constrained.
Recall that, in any given period, some constrained firms experience currently binding
borrowing constraints while the others do not. We call the latter constrained firms Type-
1, and the firms with currently binding constraints Type-2. Notice that Type-1 firms
can still adopt the unconstrained capital policy, Kw, but not the minimum savings policy,
Bw. The debt policy of Type-1 firms can be easily determined by the zero-dividend policy
after substituting k′ = Kw in the budget constraint. On the other hand, Type-2 firms
can only invest to the extent allowed by their borrowing limits. This constrained choice
of capital is derived from the level of cash-on-hand, m, held by Type-2 firms. Specifically,
D = 0 implies that a Type-2 firm’s decision of k′ and b′ must be feasible, given the firm’s
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available cash-on-hand. Given m, we define the upper bound of a Type-2 firm’s capital
choice as K̄(m) ≡ m
1−qθ , from the binding collateral constraint. Firms with more cash-
on-hand, therefore, can relax this upper bound until they can choose the unconstrained
capital policy, Kw. Notice also that the upper bound, K̄(m), approaches infinity as the
financial parameter θ becomes closer to q−1, which illustrates the case of perfect credit
markets. Below, we summarize the decision rules of k′ and b′ by firm type, given (m, ε).
• Firms with m ≥ m̃(ε) are unconstrained and therefore adopt Kw(ε) and Bw(ε).
• For constrained firms with m < m̃(ε), the upper bound for k′ is K̄(m) ≡ m1−qθ .
– Firms with Kw(ε) ≤ K̄(m) are Type-1 and adopt k′ = Kw(ε) and b′ = 1q
(
Kw(ε)−m
)
.
– Firms with Kw(ε) > K̄(m) are Type-2 and adopt k′ = K̄(m) and b′ = 1q
(
K̄(m)−m
)
.
3 Model Parameters and Steady State
We numerically solve the model by using non-linear methods, and find a stationary
equilibrium where individual decisions are consistent with market clearing prices. In
Section 3.1, we calibrate the model to be consistent with the observed data in the US.
Once the model is calibrated, in Section 3.2, we show how a firm’s individual state is
related to its decision of investment, borrowing, entry and exit. This helps us understand
the role of key model ingredients, in the absence of any policy intervention. Based on this
initial equilibrium, we consider policy counterfactual experiments in the following section.
3.1 Calibration
The model is annual, and we assume the standard functional forms of household
preference and production technology in the literature. The period utility function of the
representative household features the indivisible labor, U(C, 1−N) = logC + ψ(1−N),
following Rogerson (1988).23 The DRS production function is in Cobb-Douglas form,
F (k, n) = kαnν , with α, ν > 0 and α+ν < 1. Given the assumed functional forms, we set
the model parameter values to jointly match the key macroeconomic moments and the
firm-level heterogeneity observed in the US data. Table 1 reports the parameter values
used in our calibration, and Table 2 summarizes the resulting moments from the model
along with the corresponding US data.
23 The assumed preference is used in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), to study the macroeconomic
implications of firing costs. In the appendix, we consider a case with inelastic labor supply, and our main
results are robust.
14
Table 1 : Parameter Values
Model Parameter Values
α 0.280 θ 0.820
β 0.960 Me 0.300
δ 0.069 χe 0.0436
ν 0.600 Nε 13
ψ 2.480 ρε 0.750
πd 0.100 εm 0.393
ξo 0.03392 εM 1.122
ξe 0.00991 γε 4.420
First, we set the value of the subjective discount factor, β, to imply the long-run
real interest rate of about 4 percent per annum. The curvature of labor input in the
production function, ν, is set to have the average share of labor income of 0.6, following
Cooley and Prescott (1995). We set the preference parameter of labor disutility, ψ, to get
the average hours worked of 0.33 at the stationary equilibrium of the model. The annual
depreciation rate, δ, is chosen to match the average aggregate investment to capital ratio
of the postwar US economy, while the production parameter, α, is set to be consistent with
the average capital to output ratio of 2.3. For the aggregate time series of investment,
output, and private capital, we use the Fixed Asset Tables and National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) between 1954
and 2007. The parameter value in the collateral constraint, θ, is 0.82, to imply the average
debt to capital ratio of the non-farm, non-financial businesses in the Flow of Funds from
1954 to 2007.
We set the exogenous exit rate in the model, πd, at 0.10 and the fixed measure of po-
tential entrants, M e, at 0.30. We further assume that the maximum leverage of potential
entrants, θe, is the half of that of incumbents, θ. The rest of model parameter values are
calibrated to reproduce the observed size and age distributions of firms and the moments
of firm entry and exit in the data. The parameter values of the fixed operation cost, ξo,
and the entry cost, ξe, largely determine the quantitative magnitude of the entry and exit
margins, given a value of χe which determines the relative size of the largest entrants, k̄0,
to that of incumbents. Our calibrated model implies both the average total exit rate of
private firms (11 percent) and the relative total employment by entrants to the aggregate
(3 percent) are close to the BDS data. In addition, the above parameters governing firm
dynamics in the model critically affect the resulting shape of firm age distribution. Table
2 shows that our model also successfully matches the average distribution of firm age in
the BDS.
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Table 2 : Moments
Aggregate Moments
Description Data Model
Average hours worked - 0.333
Measure of firms,
∫
µ · dµ - 1.000
Investment to capital ratio (BEA) 0.069 0.069
Capital to output ratio (BEA) 2.300 2.222
Debt to capital ratio (Flow of Funds) 0.567 0.564
Total exit rate (BDS) 0.110 0.114
Employment share of entrants (BDS) 0.033 0.033
Firm Size Distribution Firm Age Distribution
Employment Share Population Share Population Share
Employees Data Model Data Model Age Data Model
1 to 4 0.0584 0.0584 0.5506 0.5412 0 0.1236 0.1176
5 to 19 0.1455 0.1455 0.3342 0.3299 1 0.0950 0.0870
20 to 99 0.1814 0.1814 0.0964 0.0911 2 0.0806 0.0766
100 to 499 0.1395 0.1395 0.0153 0.0225 3 0.0697 0.0691
500 to 2499 0.1179 0.1179 0.0026 0.0083 4 0.0613 0.0624
2500+ 0.3573 0.3573 0.0009 0.0071 5 0.0548 0.0564
6 to 10 0.1939 0.2104
SME (1-499) 0.5248 0.5248 0.9965 0.9847 11 to 15 0.1302 0.1271
16+ 0.1910 0.1934
Young (0-4) 0.4302 0.4127
Note: The empirical firm size and age distributions are calculated from the annual tables in the BDS
database. We report the average values from 1977 to 2007 for the size distribution, and from 1993 to 2007
for the age distribution, respectively. SME denotes small-medium sized enterprises.
In order to replicate the empirical firm size distribution, we assume that the idiosyn-
cratic productivity, ε, is drawn from a time-invariant distribution, G(ε; εm, εM , γε), which
is a bounded Pareto distribution. In each period, a firm in our model economy retains its
previous level of individual productivity with a fixed probability, ρε. We set ρε = 0.75 to
be consistent with the evidence on the persistence of firm-level productivity in the data.24
The bounds of ε support, (εm, εM), and the shape parameter, γε, of the bounded Pareto
distribution are chosen to have both the employment share and the population share in
each firm size bin aligned with the corresponding average values reported in the BDS from
1977 to 2007. We discretize ε using 13 values in our numerical applications.25
24 The constant hazard of resetting productivity is recently employed in the models of production
heterogeneity. See Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) or Buera and Shin (2013), for example. The average
persistence of ε in a long simulation is very close to the value of ρε. This falls into the range of the
persistence estimates in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).
25 Our simulation of the assumed ε process results in the unconditional mean of 0.466 and the standard
deviation of 0.113. The share of firms with productivity less than the mean value is about 73 percent.
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Table 2 reports the model-generated firm size distribution and its empirical counter-
part, in which we divide the employment size groups by 6 bins. As is well known in the
literature, Table 2 shows that the empirical distribution of firm size is highly skewed,
where more than 88 percent of firms hire fewer than 20 employees in a given year. We al-
most perfectly replicate this lower tail of the empirical firm size distribution in our model
economy by employing the Pareto-distributed ε. By the nature of the collateral constraint
that we assumed, moreover, small firms in the size distribution are more likely to be finan-
cially constrained when their productivity is relatively high whereas their cash-on-hand
is insufficient.
Before we discuss the quantitative results from the model, we elaborate our procedure
of computing the model-generated firm size distribution which is directly taken from Jo
(2017). Given the stationary distribution of firms, µ(k, b, ε), in equilibrium, we begin with
constructing a cumulative distribution of employment by using Nw(k, ε). Based on the
employment shares across size bins in the BDS, we find the employment threshold, n̄, in
each firm size group along the above cumulative distribution from the model. We then
compute the measure of firms specifically located on each firm size bin which is defined
from those employment thresholds. In sum, we first align the model employment shares
by firm size to be exactly the same with the corresponding values in the BDS, and then
choose the parameter values to generate the model population shares as closely as possible
to the data.
3.2 Steady State: Firm Heterogeneity and Decisions
We begin with describing the stationary distribution of firms in the model. Figure
1 shows the entire distribution of cash-on-hand, m(k, b, ε), at the steady state. The
distribution of m is highly skewed with more than 88 percent of firms holding cash-on-
hand of less than 1. This represents the corresponding shape of the underlying firm size
distribution in the model, as reported in Table 2 and Figure 2. It follows that our model
generates substantial heterogeneity at the firm level that is endogenously determined by
the combination of persistent productivity shocks, collateral constraints, and endogenous
margins of firm entry and exit.
More importantly, firms with small cash-on-hand are those most likely to be financially
constrained subject to their productivity and borrowing limits, as we discussed in Section
2. To see this more clearly, Figure 3 provides a snapshot of the decision rules of incumbent
firms on capital, k′, debt, b′, and dividends, D, as functions of m(k, b, ε) at a specific
value of ε. In the figure, we add the two vertical lines to distinguish the firm types by
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m(k, b, ε): unconstrained , Type-1, and Type-2. The vertical line near m = 100 represents
the threshold for being unconstrained, m̃(ε), and the one near m = 20 is the threshold
for being Type-1 firms. Starting from the right-hand side of the figure, when a firm has
survived and accumulated sufficient wealth over time such that m ≥ m̃(ε), it is considered
unconstrained. The firm then adopts the unconstrained choices of capital, Kw(ε), and
debt, Bw(ε), and starts paying positive dividends. Constrained firms with m less than
the above threshold value, in contrast, follow the zero-dividend policy to accumulate
their internal savings in order to become unconstrained. Type-1 firms between the two
thresholds can still adopt the optimal level of capital, Kw(ε), while gradually reducing
debt as their m increases. Lastly, Type-2 firms with small m are only able to invest up to
their borrowing limits, so their choice of capital is constrained with positive borrowing.
From Figure 1, we observe that these Type-2 firms are concentrated at the lower tail of
the cash-on-hand distribution while maintaining positive leverages.
In our model, young firms start relatively small upon entry and then gradually accumu-
late cash-on-hand over time. These lifecycle dynamics of incumbent firms are illustrated
in Figure 4. At age 0, an average firm in our model economy is financially constrained
because it is short on collateral for external financing. Thus, the firm keeps raising its
external debt level until age 4 and then gradually de-leverages once it can finance the
optimal level of investment for Kw(ε), around age 6. In addition, conditional on remain-
ing in the economy, firms still accumulate financial savings even after age 18, so they
eventually become unconstrained and pay positive dividends. This is represented by the
hump-shaped leverage curve in the lower panel of the figure. Any policy targeting firms in
a specific age group will therefore shift the average lifecycle dynamics in Figure 4, which
eventually reshapes the entire firm distribution in the long-run.
Next, we look at the endogenous exit decision by incumbent firms at the steady state
of the model. Figure 5 shows the exit choice (=1) over capital and debt over the ergodic
distribution of ε. Consistent with conventional knowledge, a firm in the model decides
to exit when it accumulates relatively larger debt than its existing capital stock. This is
because the continuation value of such an over-leveraged firm falls below 0, and the firm
thus finds it better to exit before paying the fixed operation cost as illustrated in Equation
(4). Such vulnerable incumbents largely correspond to Type-2 firms in the model, and,
in Figure 5, the exit decision occurs at the margin of positive leverages (b/k > 0), which
is the case of binding collateral constraints. Young firms with both low productivity and
small wealth are easily tempted to this outside option of exit, so we are also able to capture
the disproportionately high exit rate among those firms. This endogenous margin of firm
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dynamics in our model naturally entails a cleansing mechanism that drives unprofitable
firms out of the economy, which is in contrast to the case with only exogenous exit.
Lastly, Figure 6 presents the entry decision by potential entrants. Recall that the
potential entrants are uniformly distributed over (k0, b0) at a given level of initial produc-
tivity, ε0, which is drawn from a bounded Pareto distribution. We calculate the average
decision of entry weighted over ε0, and the brightest area in Figure 6 implies entry (=1).
In the clear case of entry (the brightest area), a potential entrant is more likely to bear
the fixed cost of entry when its initial capital, k0, is relatively larger than its debt, b0.
It follows that the slope of the entry threshold, where the color map changes into the
brightest color, represents the maximum leverage that the actual entrants can take. The
area of entry becomes larger when the initial productivity of potential entrants is higher,
so the dark colored areas between 0 and 1 illustrate the entry decisions across potential
entrants with different ε0. That is, more firms enter the economy in the areas with lower
k0 and higher b0 as initial productivity increases. Since the share of potential entrants
with high ε0 is relatively small, the average entry probability gets lower at higher produc-
tivity levels. Moreover, the slope of the entry threshold in the figure becomes steeper as
the initial productivity increases. This implies that the entrants with high ε0 are allowed
to take more leverage when they decide to enter. Such firms have strong growth potential
over time, while the persistence and the relative dispersion of the underlying productivity
distribution jointly determine the severity of financial frictions at the micro level.
4 Targeted Credit Policies
We next examine the aggregate consequences of credit subsidies. First, we provide
a brief overview of our policy experiments in the model. In Section 4.2, we discuss the
aggregate changes following credit subsidy policies in general equilibrium. Section 4.3
provides a step-by-step analysis of our results by isolating the moving forces in the model.
We look at changes in firm dynamics in Section 4.4.
4.1 Overview of Counterfactual Exercises
Our counterfactual policy exercise is to compare the pre-intervention equilibrium de-
scribed in the previous section, (benchmark), and the post-intervention equilibrium, which
is the new equilibrium reached by the economy after implementation of credit subsidy poli-
cies. That is, we measure the equilibrium changes in the aggregate economy under each
policy relative to the benchmark.
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Credit Subsidies Policy implementation works as follows. Suppose that the govern-
ment selects a group of target firms and provides them with credit subsidies. If a firm
faces binding collateral constraint, then the credit subsidizing policy helps it to achieve
the optimal level of capital stock, by setting θ = q−1 > θss, where θss is the value at the
benchmark.26 We assume that the government can exactly identify firms with binding
borrowing constraints and help only such firms. Therefore, the actual number of subsi-
dized firms is a subset of each targeted group.27 We consider two different target groups,
small firms (size-dependent policy) and young firms (age-dependent policy). The size-
dependent policy selects small-medium sized firms (SME), defined as those hiring fewer
than 500 employees, whereas the age-dependent policy selects firms with age between 0
and 4.28 The rest of the firms that are not given credit subsidies may be constrained by
the borrowing limits with θ = θss. The other model parameter values remain the same as
in the benchmark.
We also attempt to relate our policy experiments to an existing policy.29 One promi-
nent policy that aims at helping young or small firms is the 7(a) Loan Guaranty Program
by the US SBA. It is the most commonly used financing opportunity for small businesses
in the US, and approved loans under the program can be flexibly spent on working capital,
equipment, debt refinancing, and so forth. As shown in the table below, both the gross
amount of approved loans and the average size of loans have been steadily growing over
time, whereas the total number of loan approved has been somewhat stagnant.
SBA 7(a) Loan Program
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 avg.
loan approved, $bil. 12.819 9.264 12.424 19.703 15.256 18.061 19.446 23.884 16.357
no. of loans approved 69441 41273 46922 53688 44358 46389 52044 63460 52197
avg. loan, $mil. 0.185 0.224 0.265 0.367 0.344 0.389 0.374 0.376 –
Note: The above figures are from the SBA online tables on Loan Program Performance (www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-
performance), as of March 2018. All observations are fiscal years.
Since there are several key differences between the SBA loan program and our coun-
26 The government subsidizes only the additionally required investment for the targeted firms such that
they can obtain an efficient scale of production at a given level of productivity. Catherine et al. (2018)
also consider the similar type of counterfactuals. We include the results from modest increases in θ in
the appendix.
27 This is a different approach from that taken by Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008). They investigate
the effects of distortionary taxes on factor input uses. Once a firm falls into the targeted group in their
model, its size is always restricted by such policies.
28 Our definitions of small and young firms are consistent with those of Fort et al. (2013).
29 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to examine how an actual policy translates into
the model.
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terfactual policies, a direct mapping of the policy into our model economy is infeasible.30
Instead, we attempt an indirect but useful counterpart of the actual policy in the model.
The basic idea of this exercise is to count the number of firms that are affected by the SBA
program, and then to find a comparable case of the size-dependent policy that adjusts θ
for SMEs in our model.
According to the previous table, the average loan approval per year is 52,197 between
2008 and 2015. This is about 1.02 percent of all private firms in 2015 BDS, implying that
a very small number of SMEs were able to obtain financial assistance using the SBA loan
program. We assume that these firms were previously at their borrowing limit, which
are identified as Type-2 firms in our model. Noting that about 9.92 percent of firms are
Type-2 in the benchmark economy, we find a corresponding policy for SMEs in the model
which reduces Type-2 firms by 1.02 percent. The imputed size of policy is to raise θ by 5
percent (0.82 to 0.861) for SMEs in the model. We regard this specific policy intervention
as the model counterpart to the actual policy implemented in the US. The main difference
of our policy from the SBA program is that we provide economy-wide credit subsidies to
all Type-2 firms which leads to a fall in the number of such firms after the policy.
Measuring Policy Effects We assume that subsidized capital is financed by lump-
sum cash transfers from households. This assumption allows us to isolate and highlight
the unintended effects of credit subsidies through general equilibrium price adjustments.
Importantly, the total amount of cash transfers will be determined in equilibrium as poli-
cies affect the distribution of firms and change the level of unconstrained capital, Kw(ε).
To compute the total cash transfers under a certain policy, we identify the firms with
binding borrowing constraints and then calculate the gap between those firms’ efficient
investment, i, and the constrained level of investment without the policy, iB. The total
cash transfer, rt, is computed by aggregating the gap between i and iB:
rt(p) =
∫
µB
(i− iB)dµB,
where µB denotes the measure of subsidized firms with binding borrowing constraints on
µ(k, b, ε). Notice that rt can be large because our policy intervention is economy-wide, in
contrast to actual policies with low take-up rates.31
30 There is substantial heterogeneity in approved loan rates and maturity terms across firms. Moreover,
the SBA has its own size standard for eligibility, and the employment size limit for being a small business
varies from 500 to 1500 by industry. This limits our ability to construct a more direct and realistic
mapping.
31 Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2017) also discuss the observed low take-up rates of microfinance programs
in developing economies.
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We measure the aggregate gains, relative to the benchmark economy, in the measured
total factor productivity, ∆TFP , following each credit subsidy policy. We calculate TFP
as the Solow residual, Y/(KαNν), given aggregate output (Y ), capital (K), and labor
(N) while fixing α and ν values at the benchmark. As will be discussed below, any
policy intervention in our model economy involves changes in the equilibrium number of
firms. Due to DRS production technology, TFP generally falls in the total number of
firms given the same aggregate quantities. To control for the differences in the number
of firms across policy regimes, we also measure the average productivity gains per firm,
∆TFPµ, which can be calculated by re-scaling the aggregate variables by the measure of
firms. In addition, note that the required cash transfer in each policy differs when the
firm distribution changes in equilibrium. We normalize ∆TFP by the total amount of
credit subsidy, ∆TFP/rt, to measure the average TFP gain per unit of credit subsidy.
This quantifies how effective each policy is in terms of resolving resource misallocation
across firms.
Lastly, we compare the welfare consequences from different policies aimed at resolving
financial frictions. Following the standard approach, we measure consumption equivalence
variations (CEV) relative to the benchmark economy.32
4.2 Aggregate Results
This sub-section presents the results from our counterfactual analysis of the age- and
size-dependent policies and those from the model counterpart to the SBA program de-
scribed above. We examine the aggregate effects of each credit subsidy policy and discuss
the direct effect and the indirect general equilibrium effects.
4.2.1 Direct and Indirect Effects of Policies
As in Table 3, both age- and size-dependent policies largely improve aggregate out-
comes in the economy. Specifically, the age-dependent policy for young firms raises aggre-
gate consumption and capital, respectively, by 5.6 and 11.5 percent from the benchmark,
while output slightly falls. In the following, we explain that this fall in aggregate out-
put is mainly from the huge decrease in the number of firms after the age-dependent
policy is implemented. Aggregate output under the size-dependent policy that targets
small-medium sized firms (SMEs), on the other hand, increases by 2.7 percent from its
32 Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) use a similar approach to investigate the welfare effects of firing
costs.
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pre-policy equilibrium. In addition, our welfare measurement (CEV ) increases by more
than 9 percent following these credit subsidy policies This is mainly due to the rise in
equilibrium consumption and the fall in employment in both cases. Because we abstract
from policy-related distortions in our policy experiments, we view the aggregate improve-
ments in Table 3 as the upper bounds of the positive impacts from the economy-wide
credit subsidizing policies.
Table 3 : Aggregate Results from Policy Experiments
Policy Counterfactual: Aggregates
Benchmark Age-dependent Size-dependent
(age 0 to 4,
θ = q−1)
(SMEs, θ = q−1)
consumption 100 (0.1876) 105.60 106.29
capital 100 (0.5744) 111.54 113.04
output 100 (0.2584) 99.88 102.71
employment 100 (0.3334) 94.54 96.55
debt 100 (0.3238) 147.56 144.66
cash-on-hand 100 (0.8020) 80.27 87.68
firms (µ) 1.0001 0.5193 0.6802
endo. exit rate 0.0140 0.0430 0.0203
entrants rel. size 0.0331 0.0197 0.0196
cash transfer (rt) − 0.2282 0.2003
subsidized firms (µB) − 0.0558 0.0555
Type-2 share 0.0992 0.0117 0.0151
∆TFP (%) (0.5834) 0.1885 1.3541
∆TFP/rt − 0.0048 0.0394
∆TFPµ(%) − 8.3819 6.1536
CEV(%) − 10.4700 9.3700
Note: In the top panel, we normalize aggregate quantities to 100 in the benchmark, and the values in the
parentheses are the corresponding absolute levels. rt is the required cash transfer in each policy. ∆TFP
refers to the relative change in the measured total factor productivity from the benchmark. ∆TFPµ is
the productivity gain per firm. CEV denotes the consumption equivalent measure of welfare.
The above aggregate improvements are mainly due to the reduced resource misalloca-
tion across firms. In our model, collateral constraints prevent small but productive firms
from undertaking investment at their desired level. Insufficient capital in these firms re-
duces aggregate TFP. Therefore, providing credit subsidies to such firms resolves capital
misallocation, which in turn leads to increased aggregate productivity. In Table 3, this
first-order impact is shown by the fall in the share of Type-2 firms, thus raising the mea-
sured TFP (∆TFP ) following each targeted policy. The productivity improvement from
the age-dependent policy is 0.19 percent relative to the benchmark, and that from the
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size-dependent policy is 1.35 percent. These gains are obtained by subsidizing firms with
binding borrowing constraints, which accounts for about 8 to 10 percent of the entire
population (µB/µ). We also normalize the productivity gains by the size of cash transfers
from households, (∆TFP/rt). It follows that the size-dependent policy leads to higher
marginal gains per transfer in productivity than the age-dependent policy does.
Notice that the aggregate cash transfers, (rt), under both policies are very large,
accounting for more than 30 percent of aggregate capital. One reason is that our credit
subsidies are available economy-wide for all young or small firms with binding borrowing
constraints. This is not exactly the same in actual policies that typically support a small
number of firms in an economy as in the SBA program, and we show the results from such
cases later in this sub-section. Another reason is that our policy counterfactual is rather
extreme in the size of intervention per firm. In both age- and size-dependent policies,
we totally remove collateral constraints for the affected firms. Under such large policy
interventions, there are substantial increases in the average productivity of incumbents
as initially intended, while the gains in TFP are much smaller. This discrepancy is due
the indirect effects of such policies in general equilibrium, as we discuss below.
The number of firms in production (µ) drastically falls following each policy imple-
mentation, as reported in Table 3. Since the number of firms also affects the measured
TFP in each policy regime, we separately calculate the average productivity gain per
firm, ∆TFPµ. The productivity gain per firm is 8.38 percent under the age-dependent
policy and 6.15 percent under the size-dependent policy targeting SMEs. It follows that
targeting young firms results in relatively higher productivity gain for an average incum-
bent, but the associated improvement in measured TFP is rather modest. Therefore, our
results from measuring different gains in productivity, whether it is the average per firm
or per cash transfer, imply that each targeted policy has an edge over the other. This
sheds light on the importance of targeting the group of firms whose marginal gains are
large in practice.
In addition to the above direct effects from undoing capital misallocation, providing
credit subsidies involves indirect effects in general equilibrium. Following the targeted
policies, the equilibrium changes in relative prices adjust the entry and exit margins, which
eventually determines the number of firms in the economy. We now provide discussions
about these indirect channels of policies.
We begin with the extensive margins of firm entry and exit. In labor markets, due to
the boosted aggregate productivity, higher labor input by the subsidized firms leads to an
increase in the equilibrium wage rate. The rise in factor price puts more pressure on firms
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with low profitability to exit. This mechanism is represented by the higher endogenous
exit rates under the policies in Table 3, ranging from 2.0 to 4.3 percent in each period.
Moreover, the higher equilibrium wage rate also affects the entry margin of firm dy-
namics, which either strengthens or weakens the selection among potential entrants. That
is, potential firms in the model observe higher profitability under each policy that relaxes
borrowing constraints, but the increased cost of production prevents those with low pro-
ductivity from entering. These two opposing effects lead to an ambiguous prediction on
the entry margin following each policy, and we show the corresponding overall results
quantitatively. Table 3 demonstrates that both targeted policies induce more small firms
to enter the economy by paying the fixed entry cost. The average employment size of
entrants is about 60 percent (0.0197 and 0.0196) of that in the benchmark (0.0331).33
Therefore, we show that a credit subsidy targeting young or small firms rather weakens
the selection among potential entrants in equilibrium, even with the rise in the wage rate.
In the next sub-section, we also look at the relative size of this selection effect while
holding the equilibrium adjustments in exit margin and wage rate fixed.
Figure 7 illustrates the change in the entry margin after the size-dependent policy. It
clearly shows that entry occurs at any initial capital and debt combination, (k0, b0), with
positive probability, in contrast to the results shown in Figure 6 for the benchmark econ-
omy. Thus, the average size of entrants significantly falls, as shown in Table 3. Moreover,
Figure 7 shows that the entry threshold changes as the credit subsidy is implemented.
For instance, at b0 = 0, the capital threshold for the brightest area falls from 0.0992
to 0.0949. Since the slopes of the threshold lines under the size-dependent policy also
become steeper, it follows that the marginal entrants take on relatively more leverage.
Because these entrants are relatively smaller, they are also likely to face tighter collateral
constraints in addition to the fixed operating cost in the model. Combined with the higher
leverage, this raises the exit hazard of age 0 firms disproportionately, thus contributing
to the increased exit rates as shown in Table 3.
From the adjustments in the extensive margins, the number of firms falls in equilib-
rium, which in turn depresses aggregate productivity. Due to DRS production technology
at the firm level, the number of producing firms is a non-trivial factor that affects mea-
sured aggregate total factor productivity. As already shown in Table 3, the total number
of firms decreases by 32 to 48 percent relative to the benchmark economy. Fewer firms
in operation following the targeted policies dampen the aggregate gains in productivity,
33 This is qualitatively consistent with the findings in Banerjee et al. (2015). They find that the new
businesses supported by a microfinance program in India tend to have significantly smaller size.
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and this is why we observe only modest improvements in the measured TFP (∆TFP ).
The negative impact on TFP due to the fall in the number of firms can be represented
by the difference of the relative gains in TFP (∆TFP ) and in the average productivity
per firm (∆TFPµ). The age-dependent policy is relatively more successful in boosting
average firm productivity by more than 8 percent, but this gain almost disappears by
losing more firms in equilibrium.
Notice that the decreases in the number of firms are quantitatively large following each
credit subsidizing policy. One reason is that the size of policy intervention is enormous
in our policy experiments, as noted earlier, in terms of both the number of targeted firms
and the amount of individual subsidies. In addition, the skewed firm size distribution
that we reproduce in our benchmark economy features a large number of small firms.
Some of these firms are productive but financially constrained, while the others are not.
Since the latter firms are not targeted, they are vulnerable to a rise in relative prices
following a policy and thus more likely to choose to exit. It follows that this cleansing
effect of the policy quantitatively depends on the underlying firm-level productivity in a
model. As will be shown in Section 5, our joint consideration of the endogenous extensive
margins and the non-Gaussian firm productivity distribution is crucial in determining the
aggregate elasticity of an economy following a policy.
So far, we are able to identify both direct and indirect effects of credit subsidy poli-
cies targeting small and young firms. As expected, a targeted policy directly resolves
the resource misallocation faced by small or young firms. However, such policies also
have unintended effects that indirectly emerge from the equilibrium price channel. In
particular, the increased price under each policy has three effects at the firm level that in
turn affect the aggregate results. First, it reduces the efficient scales of production for all
firms. Next, the rise in price also adjusts the firm entry and exit margins to determine the
equilibrium number of firms following the introduction of a policy. The last effect comes
from the reduction in the total number of firms, which lowers the aggregate productivity
gains. Together, these direct and indirect effects jointly quantify the aggregate outcome of
a credit subsidy policy. Our results suggest that the unintended effects are quantitatively
substantial when such policies are present.
4.2.2 The SBA Loan Program
We report the aggregate results of our model counterpart to the SBA program. Table
4 shows the predicted effects of the SBA-counterpart policy, (θ ↑ 5%), and our previous
results from the size-dependent policy that totally eliminates borrowing limits for SMEs,
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(θ = q−1).
Table 4 : Aggregate Results, Size-dependent Policy and SBA
Policy Counterfactual: Aggregates, SBA Policy
Benchmark SBA Size-dependent
(θ ↑ 5%) (θ = q−1)
consumption 100 (0.1876) 100.59 106.29
capital 100 (0.5744) 100.70 113.04
output 100 (0.2584) 99.96 102.71
employment 100 (0.3334) 99.37 96.55
debt 100 (0.3238) 104.01 144.66
cash-on-hand 100 (0.8020) 97.85 87.68
firms (µ) 1.0001 0.9589 0.6802
endo. exit rate 0.0140 0.0154 0.0203
entrants rel. size 0.0331 0.0316 0.0196
Type-2 share 0.0992 0.0890 0.0151
∆TFP (%) (0.5834) 0.1371 1.3541
∆TFPµ(%) − 0.6514 6.1536
CEV(%) − 1.1100 9.3700
Note: In the top panel, we normalize aggregate quantities to 100 in the benchmark,
and the values in the parentheses are the corresponding absolute levels. ∆TFP refers
to the relative change in the measured total factor productivity from the benchmark.
∆TFPµ is the productivity gain per firm. CEV denotes the consumption equivalent
measure of welfare. The first and third columns are reproduced from Table 3, for
comparison.
Overall, the case of raising borrowing limits by 5 percent leads to a similar aggregate
outcome but of smaller magnitude, when compared to the case of completely removing
them. First, there exists a small aggregate improvement in the economy due to the
increase in TFP by 0.14 percent, following such limited credit subsidies. We still observe
substantial indirect effects of the policy, as represented by the difference between ∆TFP
and ∆TFPµ. Again, this is due to the fall in the number of firms which is more than 4
percent less than the benchmark economy. In contrast, the rise in wage rate is only about
0.58 percent from the benchmark. Our results suggest that firms sensitively respond to
credit policies through adjustments in the extensive margins, while changes in equilibrium
prices are relatively small. Due to the fall in the number of firms, aggregate output and
employment decrease despite a rise in the productivity of incumbents.
As previously discussed in detail, our analysis demonstrates the importance of consid-
ering the unintended effects of a policy that aims to promote the reallocation of resources
among firms. Although the above mapping to the actual policy is stylized, we provide one
possible method of evaluating the long-run aggregate impact of existing small business
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policies.
4.3 Inspecting the Mechanism
The indirect effects of the credit subsidy policies are quantitatively important, off-
setting potential gains in aggregate productivity that would otherwise arise. There are
different channels operating when a credit subsidizing policy is implemented. These chan-
nels include reallocation among incumbent firms as well as adjustments in the extensive
margins, following an equilibrium change in prices. In this sub-subsection, we decompose
the total effect of a policy to isolate the net effect from each channel.34 To simply our
analysis, we only consider the SBA-counterpart policy that provides credit subsidies to
SMEs that are financially constrained.
First, the following table summarizes our procedure of decomposing the total effect.
Starting from the initial equilibrium before the policy is implemented, (Benchmark), we
introduce one channel at a time. In particular, we consider 3 different stages through
which the economy reaches the new equilibrium, (GE), after the policy. For convenience,
we name these stages as (Model A), (Model B-1), and (Model B-2). Our choice of these
stages is motivated by our previous analysis of the indirect effects of the policy in general
equilibrium.
Isolating the Effects, Multiple Stages, SBA Policy
Model Changes from (Benchmark)
(Bench-
mark)
(Model A) (Model B-1) (Model B-2) (GE)
wage – – – – X
credit subsidies – X X X X
entry margin – – X X X
exit margin – – – – X
firm measure 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 0.9589 0.9589
Note: (Benchmark) is the initial equilibrium without a policy, and (GE) is the new equilibrium after the policy.
Once the policy is implemented, while fixing the wage rate, we distinguish the intermediate stages by whether
the entry margin is adjusted or firm measure is re-scaled.
As shown in the first row of the table, each of the above steps maintains the initial
equilibrium prices in (Benchmark) which are finally replaced in (GE). In (Model A),
we allow reallocation of capital among incumbents following the introduction of subsidy,
while holding the distribution of firms fixed. Since there is no change in the entry and
34 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise by which the quality of our
quantitative analysis could be substantially improved.
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exit margins in this step, the measure of firms also remains the same as in (Benchmark).
In this way, we can measure the net productivity gains only from subsidizing financially
constrained firms. Next, in (Model B-1), we allow adjustments in the entry margin that
follows the policy. Since we keep relative prices fixed at (Benchmark), the credit subsidy
induces more entry by small and financially constrained entrants. To capture the net
selection effect upon entry, we calculate the measured TFP for a unit measure of firms in
(Model B-1). In contrast, (Model B-2) is the case when we re-scale the firm distribution
of (Model B-1) to match the number of firms at (GE) in which the changes in relative
prices are introduced. Notice that the number of firms drops when we switch from (Model
B-1) to (Model B-2), while the composition of firm types remains the same. Thus, the
associated change in TFP across these two stages implies the net effect from the change
in the number of production units. In the meantime, the TFP change from (Model B-2)
to (GE) measures the effect of higher wage on production scale, after the policy. Lastly,
the shift from (Model B-1) to (GE) represents the overall cleansing effect in general
equilibrium, combining the previous two effects with the adjustment in the exit margin.
In Table 5, we report the relative changes in TFP after introducing the SBA policy
to the benchmark economy. First, the net reallocation effect among the incumbents is
positive, raising the measured TFP by 1.05 percent. This is the direct effect of the credit
subsidy that partly resolves the existing resource misallocation across firms. TFP slightly
falls by about 0.4 percent, when we consider the change from (Model A) to (Model B-1).
This is because the subsidy induces relatively less-productive entry, while the exit margin
remains the same as in (Benchmark). As explained above, the shift from (Model B-1) to
(Model B-2) measures the net effect from the fall in the number of firms. This effect is
large enough to nearly offset the previous positive TFP gains from the policy. It turns
out that this fall in the number of firms is dominant, so that we only observe a modest
increase in overall aggregate productivity. Once firms are allowed to operate at the new
equilibrium price along with the exit margin adjustment, (Model B-2) to (GE), there is
no change in TFP.
We further observe that the overall cleansing effect from (Model B-1) to (GE) is
substantially negative (-0.51 percent), which almost offsets positive TFP gains from the
policy. This is because the financial friction in our model also plays a role in eliminating
less productive firms through the endogenous exit margin. Once the credit subsidy is
implemented, however, this cleansing mechanism of the collateral constraint is weakened
so that relatively less productive firms survive longer in the economy. The overall magni-
tude of the cleansing effect is endogenously determined by adjustments in both entry and
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Table 5 : TFP Changes across Intermediate Stages, SBA policy
Isolating the Effects, SBA policy
(Bench-
mark)
(Model A) (Model B-1) (Model B-2) (GE)
(Pareto ε)
firm measure 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 0.9589 0.9589
TFP 0.5834 0.5895 0.5872 0.5842 0.5842
∆TFP (%) – 1.0456 0.6514 0.1371 0.1371
Note: We calculate TFP in each stage, while fixing α and nu values at (Benchmark). ∆TFP (%) denotes
the percentage deviation of TFP from (Benchmark).
exit margins, which eventually affects the equilibrium number of firms in the economy,
as discussed in the previous sub-section. Our quantitative results suggest that individual
effects of these channels are large while offsetting each other. It follows that there can be
a small increase in aggregate productivity from a credit subsidizing policy, when we take
all the above indirect effects into account in a general equilibrium environment.
4.4 Firm Dynamics
In Section 4.2, we consider credit subsidizing policies oriented towards different targets,
either young or small firms, and hence having disparate impacts. It is evident that such
policies affect firm-level decisions at different stages of the lifecycle. In this sub-section, we
examine how targeted credit subsidies reshape firm dynamics by looking at the evolution
of average size and productivity in a cohort over time.
Figure 8 compares the average firm dynamics under different policies, where the values
in the top panels are in relative to their respective levels at age 20. The upper-left panel of
the figure shows the typical growth pattern of entrants in our benchmark economy (blue
line with dots). First, firms, on average, start small. The relative size of entrants is about
one-fourth of that of mature firms of age 20. Upon entry, entrants start accumulating
capital and gradually become larger as they age. As they become older, selection forces
unproductive incumbents in cohort to exit the economy. Hence, as shown in the upper-
right panel of Figure 8, the average productivity of firms increases over time, whereas the
productivity of age-0 firms in our benchmark economy is about 20 percent lower than
that of age-20 firms.
Under the age-dependent policy, all firms between age 0 and 4 can achieve optimal
capital investment as collateral constraints are entirely lifted. This is reflected in the
upper-left panel of Figure 8, where the policy (red-dashed line with dots) allows firms
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aged 1 to 5 to adopt their unconstrained levels of capital. To reach unconstrained capital
at age 1, entrants take on high leverage at age 0. Thus, these young firms have their
largest borrowing levels at entry and then gradually de-leverage over time, conditional on
survival (lower-left panel). Due to the large inflow of small entrants under this policy,
as discussed earlier, the productivity of age 0 firms is slightly lower than that of the
benchmark (upper-right panel). In addition, firms older than age 4 become ineligible for
the age-dependent policy, so their average size reverts back to the levels when borrowing
constraints impact capital choices. However, since those firms were able to accumulate
more cash-on-hand under this policy, they tend to save faster in terms of financial assets
after age 5, as illustrated by the steeper fall in debt over time. This implies that, at age
5, firms are better prepared for idiosyncratic risks due to their lower leverage ratio, which
is a relatively sound financial position. Thus, we confirm that our age-dependent policy
supports young-productive firms by allowing them to survive longer, similar to selectively
protecting infant firms.35
In contrast, the case of subsidizing SMEs (solid green line), also shown in Figure
8, does not deliver the same patterns of firm growth observed under the age-dependent
policy. This is because the size-dependent policy always allows small-productive firms to
effectively finance their desired investment whenever they become Type-2, regardless of
age. Since most entrants in our model are small, the policy still accelerates the growth of
average firm size and productivity in comparison to the benchmark. This enables young
firms to immediately increase their leverage upon entry, but the pattern of de-leveraging
after age 5 is similar to that in the benchmark economy. Moreover, the indirect effect on
the entry margin still exists. As in the case of age-dependent policy, the credit subsidy
for SMEs induces more entry by smaller firms in equilibrium. This slightly lowers the
productivity of firms at age 0 (top-right panel) which then immediately rises to the levels
of age 20 firms, due to the policy. Recall that the top panels in Figure 8 are relative
to the values at age 20 in each economy. In fact, the average productivity of a cohort
under the size-dependent policy always reaches a higher absolute value than that in the
benchmark, starting from age 1. It also follows that subsidizing only SMEs is a special case
of removing financial frictions in the entire economy, because the collateral constraint we
consider mainly limits borrowing by firms with insufficient cash-on-hand in the model.36
35 This view is shared by Moll (2014), who distinguishes between the loss from misallocation at the
steady state and that during a transition. With persistent productivity shocks, Moll shows that the loss at
the steady state is relatively small, while transition dynamics are more gradual. In this regard, our policy
exercises consider the possibility of expediting the transition process by allowing firms to self-finance.
36 In the appendix, we show the results from a non-targeted policy which is the case without financial
frictions in the model.
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5 The Importance of Capturing the Firm Size Dis-
tribution
In Section 3, we aligned our model to be consistent with the empirical firm size dis-
tribution, in the presence of endogenous margins of firm entry and exit. In this section,
we show how quantitative predictions of a credit subsidy policy can be changed when we
abstract from those two model elements.
5.1 Firm Size Distribution and Extensive Margins
From our policy experiments in a general equilibrium environment, we have shown
that directly resolving the resource misallocation faced by small or young firms enhances
productivity. However, this direct effect of a policy may be offset by the accompanying
indirect effects in equilibrium, which leads to modest TFP gains in the end.
Later in this section, we show that the aggregate productivity gain from credit subsidy
policies could even be negative when a model ignores the observed heterogeneity in firm
size in the data. That is, the evaluation of such policies may be significantly different and
misleading, when firm-level productivity shocks are assumed to be Gaussian, a standard
modeling assumption, in contrast to our benchmark model with Pareto-distributed pro-
ductivity. As we clarify below, the model with a standard AR(1) process cannot capture
the right tail of firm size distribution. It follows that such model ignores firms that are
currently small due collateral constraints but have strong growth potential once collat-
eral constraints are lifted, for which there are large potential gains from policies aimed
at relaxing borrowing limits. Without such firms, the direct effect of credit subsidies
becomes relatively weaker than the negative indirect effects that arise from equilibrium
adjustments in the extensive margins. If the latter is dominant, a policy may result in
a negative TFP gain in models without a realistic firm size distribution. It also follows
that such indirect effects are predicted to be much smaller in models only with exogenous
margins of firm entry and exit.
To examine the quantitative importance of our joint consideration of skewed firm-level
productivity and endogenous extensive margins, we depart from our benchmark economy
along two dimensions: log-normally distributed productivity and exogenous entry and
exit. In each different model specification, we re-calibrate the model parameter values at
the respective steady state to be consistent with the observed moments in Table 2.37
37 With log-normally distributed productivity, the model firm size distribution is not consistent with
its empirical counterpart. So, our re-calibration for such models is not intended to completely reproduce
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For the alternative specification of firm-level productivity, we consider a log AR(1)
process for ε, which replaces the Pareto distribution. Specifically, we assume log ε′ =
ρε log ε + η
′
ε with η
′
ε ∼ N (0, σ2η), which is a standard modeling choice adopted by recent
studies of heterogeneous firm models. To make the log-normal ε process comparable to
our benchmark, we simulate the Pareto ε process and fit the assumed AR (1) process
to set the values of ρε and ση.
38 Using these two parameters, we discretize the log-
normal AR(1) productivity process on a grid of 13 points, as we did in the benchmark
parameterization. Although both Pareto and log-normal productivity distributions lead
to the same persistence and volatility at the individual firm level, the population shares
of firms across productivity grid points are largely different, as shown in the left panel of
Figure 10.
For a model with exogenous entry and exit, we simply set the value of πd, the exogenous
exit rate in each period, to be the same as the total exit rate in the benchmark economy
(11.4 percent). In addition, we allow all potential entrants with mass M e = πd to start
production without paying the fixed entry cost, while matching the observed employment
size of entrants in the data. This model environment abstracts from the endogenous
cleansing effect of replacing unproductive incumbents with new firms, which we discussed
in the previous section. Hence, the model with only exogenous extensive margins leads
to a relatively higher population share of Type-2 firms whose collateral constraints are
binding at the pre-intervention equilibrium. In fact, such a model has about 29 percent of
firms as Type-2, which is almost triple the amount in our benchmark. Thus, any policy
targeted toward such firms will deliver quantitatively different aggregate results while
this alternative model still captures the moments reported in Table 2. In this regard,
we highlight the importance of endogenous changes in the extensive margins when credit
subsidy policies are introduced.
5.2 Comparison of Aggregate Results
We report the aggregate results from our policy counterfactuals in the models with
different specifications for firm-level productivity and extensive margins. In the following,
we focus only on the case of the size-dependent credit subsidy policy. Table 6 presents
the results at pre- and post-intervention equilibria; to facilitate comparisons, the earlier
the size distribution moments in the bottom panel of Table 2.
38 Figure 9 illustrates the simulation of the two different productivity processes with the same mean,
persistence, and volatility. In our policy counterfactual, we normalize the mean of the log AR(1) process
to be 1, which is innocuous.
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values in Table 3 are reproduced in the first 2 columns for our benchmark economy with
Pareto ε and endogenous margins.
Table 6 : Aggregate Results by Model Specification
Policy Counterfactual: Aggregates, Size-dependent Policy (θ = q−1)
ε process Bounded Pareto Log-normal AR(1)
entry/exit Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous
SS Size SS Size SS Size SS Size
consumption (0.1876) 106.29 (0.2281) 110.65 (0.4681) 100.73 (0.5084) 104.90
capital (0.5744) 113.04 (0.5989) 124.21 (1.5912) 102.59 (1.4665) 109.24
output (0.2584) 102.71 (0.2693) 112.81 (0.6592) 100.09 (0.6096) 105.61
employment (0.3334) 96.55 (0.3332) 101.95 (0.3332) 99.37 (0.3332) 100.69
firms (µ) 1.0001 0.6802 1.0000 1.0000 1.0004 0.9315 1.0000 1.0000
endo. exit rate 0.0140 0.0203 – – 0.0141 0.0321 – –
entrants rel. size 0.0331 0.0196 0.0331 0.0178 0.0331 0.0325 0.0331 0.0247
∆TFP (%) (0.5834) 1.3541 (0.6005) 4.9792 (1.1192) -0.2412 (1.0589) 2.6065
CEV(%) – 9.3700 – 9.1300 – 1.2600 – 4.3800
Note: SS refers the initial steady state equilibrium, and Size is the new equilibrium reached after the size-dependent
policy. In the top panel, we first normalize aggregate quantities to 100 in each SS and report their relative changes under
the policy. ∆TFP refers to the relative change in the measured total factor productivity from each steady state. CEV
denotes the consumption equivalent measure of welfare. We use re-calibrated values of α and ψ to compute TFP and CEV
in each model specification.
First, in the first 4 columns of the table, we compare the aggregate consequences of the
size-dependent policy with and without the endogenous margins of firm entry and exit. In
contrast to our benchmark case, the policy counterfactual for the model with exogenous
entry and exit exhibits larger positive changes for all the aggregate variables (columns 3
and 4), apart from the number of firms (µ) which remains constant. Without a decline
in the total number of firms in operation in the economy, the aggregate productivity gain
is larger in this model, about 4.98 percent, in contrast to the benchmark case with a
1.35 percent gain. This result is intuitive because there is no equilibrium adjustment
in the extensive margins which negatively affects the aggregate productivity eventually.
Our result highlights the importance of endogenous extensive margins in quantitatively
determining the macroeconomic impact of credit subsidizing policies. It is also evident
that the losses from resource misallocation due to financial frictions can vary across models
with different specifications of firm entry and exit, as pointed out in recent studies.39
In Table 6, the same policy experiment in the model instead with a log AR(1) ε process
39 Midrigan and Xu (2014) consider a two-sector model economy with financial frictions existing only
in the modern sector. They consider endogenous extensive margins in their extended version of the model
and find relatively small losses from resource misallocation, which is consistent with our results.
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(columns 5 and 6) reveals a more striking result; the sign of the aggregate productivity
gain changes from positive to negative. Specifically, the credit subsidy in this model low-
ers the measured TFP by 0.24 percent relative to its pre-intervention steady state.40 This
is in stark contrast to the results from our benchmark economy where both size- and age-
dependent policies, at least, lead to positive gains in aggregate productivity. Moreover, it
is noticeable that the negative impact on TFP emerges without any direct policy distor-
tions because we maintain our assumption of lump-sum cash transfers across all model
variations in Table 6. As a result, the aggregate improvement is quite modest in the model
with log-normally distributed firm productivity, and the corresponding household welfare
increases only by 1.26 percent. Recall that we adopt the Pareto-distributed ε process
mainly to reproduce the observed dispersion and skewness in firm size distribution in the
data.41 Thus, the above comparison simply illustrates that a model without a realistic
firm size distribution may give rise to inaccurate, or potentially wrong, predictions of
targeted industrial policies in the long run.
The above result is largely robust across different sizes of policy intervention. To
see this, we now vary the rise in θ by 5 percent and 10 percent. Table 7 reports the
aggregate results from the model with log AR(1) firm productivity and endogenous entry
and exit margins, following these limited subsidies. In the table, we still observe the
same patterns of aggregate changes though at smaller magnitudes (columns 2 and 3).
Moreover, we observe the gains in aggregate productivity dramatically falls as the size
of policy intervention increases. That is, the change in TFP is almost zero in the case
of raising θ by 5 percent for SMEs, and it becomes -0.11 percent when θ is 10 percent
above its steady state value.42 Since these policies still improve the average productivity
of incumbents substantially, we can infer that the indirect effects in general equilibrium
quantify the overall gains in aggregate productivity. Together, our results in Tables 6
and 7 demonstrate the importance of considering the skewed firm size distribution when
evaluating credit subsidy policies.
To examine this disparity from the perspective of firm dynamics, we further look at
how firm dynamics compare in the above models that differ in their firm productivity
40 Similarly, the age-dependent policy in the same model results in a negative productivity gain of 0.31
percent. We provide the counterpart results of Table 6 under the age-dependent policy in the appendix.
41 The model economy with a log AR(1) process with endogenous margins largely fails to generate a
realistic firm size distribution at its steady state. The resulting population share of SMEs is 85.7 percent,
in contrast to 98.5 percent in our benchmark economy, whereas their total employment share still matches
the observed value in the BDS.
42 We also observe negative TFP gains following the age-dependent policies in different sizes. See Table
14 in the appendix.
35
Table 7 : Aggregate Results, Model with Log-normal AR(1)
Policy Counterfactual: Aggregates, Model with log-N ε
Size-dependent Policy
SS (θ ↑ 5%) (θ ↑ 10%) (θ = q−1)
consumption
100
(0.4681)
100.30 100.53 100.73
capital
100
(1.5912)
100.68 101.50 102.59
output
100
(0.6592)
100.02 99.95 100.09
employment
100
(0.3332)
99.70 99.43 99.37
firms (µ) 1.0004 0.9752 0.9470 0.9315
endo. exit rate 0.0141 0.0172 0.0207 0.0321
entrants rel. size 0.0331 0.0326 0.0321 0.0325
∆TFP (%) (1.1192) 0.0089 -0.1162 -0.2412
∆TFPµ(%) – 0.3396 0.5630 0.6345
CEV (%) – 0.5500 1.0200 1.2600
Note: SS refers the initial steady state equilibrium. In the top panel, we first normalize
aggregate quantities to 100 in SS and report their relative changes under the policy.
∆TFP refers to the relative change in the measured total factor productivity from SS.
∆TFPµ is the productivity gain per firm. CEV denotes the consumption equivalent
measure of welfare.
distribution. We calculate the average levels of capital and TFP for each age group
of firms following the size-dependent policy considered in Table 6. Figure 11 plots the
gap between pre- and post-intervention capital and TFP across age cohorts, by model
specification. Overall, the dynamics of firm size and productivity display qualitatively
similar patterns between the two different models. The top panel of the figure shows
that credit subsidies disproportionately raise the level of capital held by young firms in
relative to that by mature firms. However, the magnitude of such changes is much more
pronounced in our benchmark case with Pareto-distributed firm productivity.
5.3 Factors Affecting Reallocation and Equilibrium Effects
Why are the overall policy impacts relatively small in the model with log-normally
distributed productivity? As we see in the left panel of Figure 10, the right tail of the
ergodic distribution of a log-normal ε process does not stretch out enough (the highest ε
value is below 0.7) in comparison to the Pareto case, which has a maximum ε value greater
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than 1.1. Given the convexity of the optimal capital decision, as shown in the right panel
of Figure 10, the right tail of the firm-level productivity distribution matters because the
potential gain from a credit subsidy is large when firms with such high productivity are
financially constrained. This is indeed the case in our comparison in Table 6, and it leads
to the substantial differences in firm dynamics as shown in Figure 11. It follows, for a
positive aggregate productivity gain, that firms with huge growth potential but without
sufficient funds should be included in the group targeted by credit subsidy policies. As
discussed earlier, this is exactly the direct effect of such policies that reallocate resources
toward financially constrained firms (RE effect). Otherwise, as in the alternative model
with log-normally distributed ε, the opposing indirect effect in equilibrium (GE effect)
becomes more pervasive.
While the skewness of the productivity distribution matters for the size of the RE effect
of a policy, the composition of firms in the economy affects the size of the accompanying
GE effect and thus eventually determines the overall policy impacts in equilibrium. In our
model, the composition of firms is characterized by firm lifecyle dynamics in the long-run.
This in turn implies that the exogenous exit rate in the model plays a role in driving
the GE effect as follows.43 With a fixed probability of exogenous exit (πd), all firms have
equal chances to exit, regardless of the financial status and the level of productivity. With
endogenous exit, on the other hand, financially constrained and unproductive firms are
more likely to exit. Therefore, in an economy with a higher πd, the GE effect through
extensive margins is relatively weaker; and, moreover, the RE effect that hinges on the
skewness of the firm size distribution becomes more important.
To see the above discussion more clearly, Table 8 decomposes the overall effect of the
size-dependent policy into the RE and GE effects and examines the relative strength of
these effects and their relationships with the exogenous exit rate. First, the reallocation
effect is larger than the GE effect for a model with Pareto ε as explained above. It reflects
the presence of the large number of firms with huge growth potential but being financially
constrained. For all cases with different values of πd and sizes of policy intervention, the
upper panel of Table 8 shows that the relative size of GE effect against RE effect (Ratio)
ranges from 57% to 87%. On the other hand, the bottom panel of the table indicates that
the GE effect is relatively dominant for most cases with log-normal ε, with Ratio ranging
from 97% to 124%. This is again because the model with log-normal ε fails to capture
highly productive firms that can most benefit from a credit subsidy policy. Second, the
43 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we explore this perspective of industrial policy
implications.
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relative importance of the RE effect increases with πd. As it can be seen in Table 8,
Ratio in our benchmark case (column 3) is significantly larger than that in an alternative
model with higher exogenous exit rate (column 6). When πd rises, the GE effect that
relies on the endogenous adjustments in the extensive margins becomes relatively smaller,
as we discussed above. This result cautiously indicates that credit subsides can be more
effective for industries with higher average exit rates and more homogeneous patterns of
firm exit.
Table 8 : Comparison of Reallocation and GE Effects, ε and πd, Size-dependent Policy
πd = 0.10 πd = 0.14
RE, (a) GE, (b)
Ratio,
|(b)|
(a)
RE, (a) GE, (b)
Ratio,
|(b)|
(a)
(Pareto ε)
θ ↑ 5% 1.0456 -0.9085 0.8689 1.4988 -1.2548 0.8372
θ ↑ 10% 1.3884 -1.0284 0.7407 1.8473 -1.3593 0.7358
θ = q−1 4.3881 -3.0340 0.6914 5.0540 -2.8930 0.5724
(log-N ε)
θ ↑ 5% 0.6433 -0.6344 0.9862 1.0136 -0.9865 0.9733
θ ↑ 10% 0.8399 -0.9561 1.1383 1.2398 -1.2760 1.0292
θ = q−1 1.0007 -1.2419 1.2410 1.4118 -1.4842 1.0513
Note: RE is the change in TFP between (Benchmark) and (Model A), measuring the reallocation
effect among incumbents, in Table 5. GE measures the TFP change between (Model A) and (GE),
and Ratio is the relative size of GE effect against RE effect.
Finally, we conduct the step-by-step analysis for the model with log-normal produc-
tivity process, as in Section 4.3. As discussed before, this exercise isolates the net effects
from different channels at work when a policy is implemented. Table 9 report the results,
in which the top panel is taken from Table 5 for comparison. We compare the results of
the SBA policy across different productivity processes.44 First, the net productivity gain
from the reallocation among incumbent firms is only 0.76 percent in the alternative model
with the log-normal process (Benchmark vs. Modal A). Apparently, the direct impact of
the policy becomes smaller as we miss highly productive but financially constrained firms.
Moreover, the assumed productivity process affects the selection at the entry margin. By
comparing (Model A) with (Model B-1), the alternative model predicts a relatively larger
negative change in aggregate TFP (-0.35 percent). On the other hand, the cleansing ef-
fect remains substantial even with the log-normal productivity process so that the sign of
productivity gain becomes negative (Model B-1 vs. GE). The model also predicts similar
patterns of the above changes when the size of policy intervention is larger.
44 The case of the age-dependent policy can be found in the appendix.
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Table 9 : TFP Changes across Intermediate Stages, SBA policy
Isolating the Effects, SBA policy
(Bench-
mark)
(Model A) (Model B-1) (Model B-2) (GE)
(Pareto ε, SBA Policy)
firm measure 1.0001 1.0001 1.0001 0.9589 0.9589
TFP 0.5834 0.5895 0.5872 0.5842 0.5842
∆TFP (%) – 1.0456 0.6514 0.1371 0.1371
(log-N ε, SBA Policy)
firm measure 1.0004 1.0004 1.0004 0.9600 0.9600
TFP 1.1192 1.1278 1.1239 1.1183 1.1188
∆TFP (%) – 0.7684 0.4199 -0.0804 -0.0357
(log-N ε, θ = q−1)
firm measure – 1.0004 1.0004 0.9315 0.9315
TFP – 1.1304 1.1254 1.1159 1.1165
∆TFP (%) – 1.0007 0.5540 -0.2949 -0.2412
Note: We calculate TFP in each stage, while fixing α and nu values at (Benchmark). ∆TFP (%) denotes
the percentage deviation of TFP from (Benchmark).
In sum, we illustrate a case for which the aggregate consequences of an industrial policy
may be altered when a calibrated model only targets macroeconomic moments without
considering the endogenous extensive margins and the empirical firm size distribution.
In other words, introducing such model elements is not only a prerequisite for being
consistent with micro-level data before conducting policy counterfactual studies such as
ours, but it is also crucial in examining the equilibrium aggregate results following a
policy intervention. Therefore, our results indicate that the micro-level consistency of a
macroeconomic model is vital to quantifying the aggregate outcomes of targeted credit
policies. Moreover, this also implies that understanding the firm-level heterogeneity of
an economy is essential in designing and implementing such targeted policies in practice,
which we believe is missing in micro-evaluations of policies.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms with
collateral constraints and endogenous entry and exit. By employing a bounded Pareto
distribution for firm-level productivity, our model replicates cross-sectional features of firm
dynamics and firm size distribution, as seen in the BDS. We use this model to quantify the
macroeconomic implications of targeted credit subsidy policies. We show that aggregate
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outcomes of such policies critically depend on the underlying distribution of firms and
their financial status. Subsidized credit alleviates credit constraints faced by small and
young firms, which helps them achieve efficient and larger scales of production. This
direct effect is, however, either reinforced or offset by indirect general equilibrium effects.
In particular, the indirect general equilibrium effects from declines in the number of firms
in the economy dominate the direct productivity gains in a model with the standard
AR(1) process, while we found a modest productivity increase by subsidy policies in our
benchmark model with a bounded Pareto distribution for firm-level productivity. We
view this as a cautionary tale about unintended consequences of economy-wide targeted
policies that perform poorly in nurturing economic growth.
Because small and young firms account for a substantial share of employment in an
economy, policies that target these firms are popular among policymakers. However,
research on the aggregate implications of such industrial policies is scarce. We believe
that our results demonstrate a potential pitfall in the analysis of industrial policies: failure
to consider general equilibrium price movements and micro-level consistency may create
misleading public debates on such policies.
Raising allocative efficiency of resources and thus enhancing aggregate productivity
appear to be immediately relevant for many countries. In particular, a variety of targeted
industrial policies have been implemented European and Asian economies. Quantitative
investigations of such policies using our framework and micro-level firm financial data
may be useful. This paper, however, did not consider any policy distortion or incentive
problems which are also potentially important. This research is left for future study.
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Figure 1 : The stationary distribution of cash-on-hand, m(k, b, ε), at the steady state
(benchmark) of the economy.
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Figure 2 : Distribution of firms over size and age bins.
42
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
cash-on-hand m(k, b, ǫ)
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Decision Rules at ǫmax
capital k′
debt b′ > 0, saving b′ < 0
dividends D
Figure 3 : Choices of capital, debt or financial savings and dividends are plotted for each
level of cash-on-hand.
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Figure 4 : Cohort average capital, debt or financial savings, labor and leverage ratio are
constructed from a simulation of an unbalanced panel of firms.
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Figure 5 : Capital increases right to left. Debt increases front to back; negative values
are financial savings.
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Figure 6 : Entry decision over the initial (uniform) distribution of capital and debt,
(k0, b0), in the benchmark economy.
46
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
k0
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
b
0
Entry Decision, Entry (= 1), Weighted Average
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 7 : Entry decision over the initial (uniform) distribution of capital and debt,
(k0, b0), under the size-dependent policy.
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Figure 8 : Cohort average capital, TFP and leverage ratio are constructed from a simu-
lation of an unbalanced panel of firms.
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Figure 9 : Moments of the ergodic distribution for both Pareto and log-normal distribu-
tions are matched and the moments are: mean 0.466, standard deviation 0.112, coefficient
of autocorrelation 0.750. Using the parameterized processes, a panel of firms are simulated
and represented simulation paths are plotted in the above figure.
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Figure 10 : The mass of firms is plotted for each of 13 productivity grid points on the left
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Figure 11 : Cohort average capital and TFP are constructed from a simulation of an
unbalanced panel of firms.
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